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Abstract
A K-user secure Gaussian Multiple-Access-Channel (MAC) with an external eavesdropper is considered in this paper. An
achievable rate region is established for the secure discrete memoryless MAC. The secrecy sum capacity of the degraded Gaussian
MIMO MAC is proven using Gaussian codebooks. For the non-degraded Gaussian MIMO MAC, an algorithm inspired by
interference alignment technique is proposed to achieve the largest possible total Secure-Degrees-of-Freedom (S-DoF). When all
the terminals are equipped with a single antenna, Gaussian codebooks have shown to be inefficient in providing a positive S-DoF.
Instead, a novel secure coding scheme is proposed to achieve a positive S-DoF in the single antenna MAC. This scheme converts
the single-antenna system into a multiple-dimension system with fractional dimensions. The achievability scheme is based on the
alignment of signals into a small sub-space at the eavesdropper, and the simultaneous separation of the signals at the intended
receiver. Tools from the field of Diophantine Approximation in number theory are used to analyze the probability of error in the
coding scheme. It is proven that the total S-DoF of K−1
K
can be achieved for almost all channel gains. For the other channel gains,
a multi-layer coding scheme is proposed to achieve a positive S-DoF. As a function of channel gains, therefore, the achievable
S-DoF is discontinued.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information theoretic secrecy in communication systems was first introduced by Shannon in [1]. The information
theoretic secrecy requires that the received signal of the eavesdropper not provide any information about the transmitted
messages. Following the pioneering works of Wyner [2] and Csiszar et. al. [3] which studied the wiretap channel, many multi-
user channel models have been considered from a perfect secrecy point of view. The secrecy capacity rate has been established
for some basic models, including the Gaussian wiretap channel [4], the MIMO wiretap channel [5]–[9], and the fading wiretap
channel [10], [11]. Additionally, the secrecy capacity rate regions have been characterized successfully for some multi-user
channels, including the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages [12]–[16].
The secure Gaussian MAC with/without an external eavesdropper is introduced in [17]–[20]. The secure Gaussian MAC
with an external eavesdropper consists of an ordinary Gaussian MAC and an external eavesdropper. The capacity region of
this channel is still an open problem in the information theory field. For this channel, an achievable rate scheme based on
Gaussian codebooks is proposed in [20], and the sum secrecy capacity of the degraded Gaussian channel is found in [18]. For
some special cases, upper bounds, lower bounds, and some asymptotic results on the secrecy capacity exist; see for example
[21]–[24]. For the achievability part, Shannons random coding argument has proven to be effective in these works.
The secure MAC generalizes the wiretap channel. In the wiretap channel, the direct coding scheme uses the framework of
random coding, which is widely used in the analysis of multi-terminal source and channel coding problems. One approach
to find achievable sum rates for the secure MAC is to extend the random coding solution to the secure multi-user. As we
will show in this paper, this extension leads to a single-letter characterization for the secure rate region of the MAC. Our
achievability, as usual, is based on the i.i.d random binning scheme.
On the other hand, it is shown that the random coding argument may be insufficient to prove capacity theorems for certain
channels; instead, structure codes can be used to construct efficient channel codes for Gaussian channels. In reference [25],
nested lattice codes are used to provide secrecy in two-user Gaussian channels. In [25] it is shown that structure codes can
achieve a positive S-DoF in a two-user MAC. In particular, the achievability scheme of [25] provides an S-DoF of 12 for a
small category of channel gains and for the other categories, it provides a S-DoF of strictly less than 12 .
In reference [26], the concept of interference alignment is introduced and has illustrated its capability in achieving the full
DoF of a class of two-user X channels. In reference [27], and [28], a novel coding scheme applicable in networks with single
antenna nodes is proposed. This scheme converts a single antenna system into an equivalent Multiple Input Multiple Output
(MIMO) system with fractional dimensions.
In this work we establish the secrecy sum capacity of the degraded Gaussian MIMO MAC using random bininng of Gaussian
codebooks. For the non-degraded channel, we present an algorithm inspiring the notion of signal alignment to achieve the
largest S-DoF by using Gaussian codebooks. We then use the notion of real alignment of [27] to prove that for almost all
0Financial support provided by Nortel, and the corresponding matching funds by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
(NSERC), and Ontario Ministry of Research & Innovation (ORF-RE) are gratefully acknowledged.
0Please see the conference version of this work in [29].
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Fig. 1. Secure K-user Gaussian MIMO Multiple-Access-Channel
channel gains in the secure K user single-antenna Gaussian MAC, we can achieve the S-DoF of K−1
K
. Here, our scheme
uses structure codes instead of Gaussian codebooks. In the case of the channel gains for which the S-DoF of K−1
K
cannot be
achieved, we propose a multi-layer coding scheme to achieve a positive S-DoF. The scheme of this work differs from that
of [25], in the sense that our scheme achieves the S-DoF of 12 for almost all channel gains, while reference [25] provides a
scheme that achieves the S-DoF of 12 (when K = 2) for specific channel gains, i.e., algebraic irrational gains. Therefore, we
prove that the carve of S-DoF versus channel gains is almost certainly constant with many discontinuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides some background and preliminaries. In section III, we
consider the secure Gaussian MIMO MAC and establish the secrecy sum rate for the degraded channel. In this section, we
propose an algorithm to achieve the largest possible value of S-DoF for the non-degraded channel model. We present our
results for the achievable S-DoF of the single-antenna MAC in section IV. Finally, section V concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a secure K-user Gaussian MIMO Multiple-Access-Channel (MAC) as depicted in Fig. 1. In this confidential
setting, each user k (k ∈ K △= {1, 2, ...,K}) wishes to send a message Wk to the intended receiver in n uses of the channel
simultaneously, and prevent the eavesdropper from having any information about the messages. At a specific time, the signals
received by the intended receiver and the eavesdropper is given by
y =
K∑
k=1
Hkxk + n1 (1)
z=
K∑
k=1
Hk,exk + n2
where
• xk for k = 1, 2, ...,K is a real input vector of size Mk × 1 under an input average power constraint. We require that
Tr(Qk) ≤ P , where Qk = E[xkx†k]. Here, the superscript † denotes the Hermitian transpose of a vector and Tr(.)
denotes the Trace operator on the matrices.
• y and z are real output vectors which are received by the destination and the eavesdropper, respectively. These are vectors
of size N × 1 and Ne × 1, respectively.
• Hk and Hk,e for k = 1, 2, ...,K are fixed, real gain matrices which model the channel gains between the transmitters and
the intended receiver, and the eavesdropper, respectively. These are matrices of size N ×Mk and Ne ×Mk, respectively.
The channel state information is assumed to be known perfectly at all the transmitters and at all receivers.
• n1 and n2 are real Gaussian random vectors with zero means and covariance matrices N1 = E[n1n1T ] = IN and
N2 = E[n2n2
T ] = INe , respectively. Here, IM represents the identity matrix of size M ×M .
Let xnk , yn and zn denote the random channel inputs and random channel outputs matrices over a block of n samples.
Furthermore, let nn1 , and nn2 denote the additive noises of the channels. Therefore, we have
yn=
K∑
k=1
Hkx
n
k + n
n
1 (2)
zn=
K∑
k=1
Hk,ex
n
k + n
n
2 .
3Note that bold vectors are random while the matrices Hk and Hk,e are deterministic matrices for all k ∈ K. The columns
of nn1 and nn2 are independent Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices IN and INe , respectively. In addition nn1
and nn2 are independent of xnk’s and Wk’s. A ((2nR1 , 2nR2 , ..., 2nRk), n) secret code for the above channel consists of the
following components:
1) K secret message sets Wk = {1, 2, ..., 2nRk}.
2) K stochastic encoding functions fk(.) which map the secret messages to the transmitted symbols, i.e., fk : wk → xnk for
each wk ∈ Wk. At encoder k, each codeword is designed according to the transmitter’s average power constraint P .
3) A decoding function φ(.) which maps the received symbols to estimate the messages: φ(yn)→ (Wˆ1, ..., WˆK).
The reliability of the transmission is measured by the average probability of error, which is defined as the probability that
the decoded messages are not equal to the transmitted messages; that is,
P (n)e =
1∏K
k=1 2
nRk
∑
(w1,...,wK)∈W1×....×WK
P (φ(yn) 6= (w1, ..., wK)|(w1, ..., wk) is sent). (3)
The secrecy level is measured by the normalized equivocation defined as follows: The normalized equivocation for each subset
of messages WS for S ⊆ K is
∆S
△
=
H(WS |zn)
H(WS)
. (4)
The rate-equivocation tuple (R1, ..., RK , d) is said to be achievable for the Gaussian MIMO Multiple-Access-Channel with
confidential messages, if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a sequence of ((2nR1 , ..., 2nRK ), n) secret codes, such that for sufficiently
large n,
P (n)e ≤ ǫ, (5)
and
∆S ≥ d− ǫ, ∀S ⊆ K. (6)
The perfect secrecy rate tuple (R1, ..., RK) is said to be achievable when d = 1. When all the transmitted messages are
perfectly secure, we have
∆K ≥ 1− ǫ, (7)
or equivalently
H(WK|zn) ≥ H(WK)− ǫH(WK). (8)
The normalized equivocation of each subset of messages can then be written as follows:
H(WS |zn)(a)= H(WS ,WSc |zn)−H(WSc |WS , zn) (9)
= H(WK|zn)−H(WSc |WS , zn)
(b)
≥ H(WK)− ǫH(WK)−H(WSc |WS , zn)
(c)
= H(WS) +H(WSc |WS)− ǫH(WK)−H(WSc |WS , zn)
(d)
≥ H(WS)− ǫH(WK),
where (a) and (c) follow from the chain rule, (b) follows from (7) and (d) follows from the fact that conditioning always
decreases the amount of entropy. Therefore, the normalized equivocation of each subset of messages is
∆S ≥ 1− ǫ′ , (10)
where ǫ′ = H(WK)
H(WS )
ǫ. Thus, when all of the K messages are perfectly secure then it is guaranteed that any subset of the
messages becomes perfectly secure.
The total Secure Degrees-of Freedom (S-DoF) of η is said to be achievable, if the rate-equivocation tuple (R1, ..., RK , d = 1)
is achievable, and
η = lim
P→∞
∑K
k=1Rk
1
2 logP
(11)
III. SECURE DOF OF THE MULTIPLE-ANTENNA MULTIPLE-ACCESS-CHANNEL
In this section, we first present an achievability rate region for the secure discrete memoryless MAC. We then characterize
the sum capacity of the degraded secure discrete memoryless and degraded Gaussian MIMO MAC. We present an achievable
S-DoF of the non-degraded Gaussian MIMO MAC under the perfect secrecy constraint using Gaussian codebooks. In order
to satisfy the perfect secrecy constraint, we use the random binning coding scheme to generate the codebooks. To maximize
the achievable degrees of freedom, we adopt the signal alignment scheme to separate the signals at the intended receiver and
simultaneously align the signals into a small subspace at the eavesdropper.
4A. Discrete Memoryless MAC
In this subsection, we study the secure discrete MAC of P (y, z|x1, ..., xK) with K users and an external eavesdropper. The
following theorems illustrate our results:
Theorem 1: For the perfectly secure discrete memoryless MAC of P (y, z|x1, ..., xK), the region of{
(R1, ..., RK)|
∑
i∈S
Ri ≤ I(US ;Y |USc),
∑
k∈K
Rk ≤ [I(UK;Y )− I(UK;Z)]+ , ∀S ⊂ K
}
, (12)
for any distribution of P (u1)P (u2)....P (uK)P (x1|u1)P (x2|u2)...P (xK |uK)P (y, z|x1, ..., xK), is achievable.
Proof: The proof is available in Appendix A.
In this Theorem [x]+ denotes the positivity operator, i.e., [x]+ = max(x, 0). Reference [20] derived an achievable rate region
with Gaussian codebooks and power control for the Gaussian secure MAC when all the transmitters and receivers are equipped
with a single antenna. Theorem 1, however, gives an achievability secrecy rate region for the general discrete memoryless
MAC. Our achievability rate region is also larger than the region of [20] in the special Gaussian channel case. Therefore, we
have the following achievable sum rate for the secure discrete memoryless MAC:
Corollary 1: For the secure discrete memoryless MAC of P (y, z|x1, ..., xK), the following sum rate is achievable:
Rsum = max [I(UK;Y )− I(UK;Z)]+ , (13)
where the maximization is over all distributions P (u1)...P (uK)P (x1|u1)...P (xK |uK)P (y, z|x1, ..., xK) that satisfy the markov
chain WK → UK → XK → Y Z .
B. Gaussian MIMO MAC
Consider the secure Gaussian MIMO MAC of (1) which can be re-written as follows:
y = Hx+ n1 (14)
z= Hex+ n2
where, H = [H1,H2, ...,HK], He = [H1,e,H2,e, ...,HK,e], and x =
[
x
†
1,x
†
2, ...,x
†
K
]†
. Without loss of generality, assume
that all nodes are equipped with the same number of antennas, i.e., Mk = N = Ne for all k ∈ K. Note that when the channel
gain matrices Hk and Hk,e are identity matrices we can determine that one channel output is degraded w.r.t. another by
examining whether their noise covariances can be ordered correctly. In (1), however, all noise covariances are identity matrices
and the receive vectors differ only in their channel gain matrices. Therefore, similar to [30], we use the following definition
to determine a degradedness order:
Definition 1: A receive vector z = Hex + n2 is said to be degraded w.r.t. y = Hx + n1 if there exists a matrix D such
that DH = He and such that DD†  I. Alternatively, we say that He is degraded w.r.t. H.
According to this definition, it is easy to see that y can be approximated by multiplying Dy. The approximated channel has
a different additive noise which is now given by Dn1 ∼ N (0,DD†) compared to the original channel. As this approximated
channel has less noise (DD†  I), however, it is clear that any message that can be decoded by the eavesdropper, can also be
decoded by the intended receiver. In the other words WK → x→ y→ z forms a Markov chain.
Theorem 2: The secrecy sum capacity of the degraded Gaussian MIMO MAC is given by
Csum = max
Qk:Qk0,Tr(Qk)≤P
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I + ∑
k∈K
HkQkH
†
k
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣∣I +∑
k∈K
Hk,eQkH
†
k,e
∣∣∣∣∣ . (15)
Proof: We need to show that the secrecy sum capacity is as follows:
Csum =
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I +∑
k∈K
HkQkH
†
k
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣∣I +∑
k∈K
Hk,eQkH
†
k,e
∣∣∣∣∣ , (16)
if the inputs are subject to the following covariance matrices constraints:
Kxk ≤ Qk, ∀k ∈ K, (17)
where Kxk denotes the covariance matrix of xk. Theorem 3 then follows by maximization over all Q1, Q2 , ..., and QK that
satisfy the power constraint, i.e., Tr(Qk) ≤ P , for all k ∈ K.
The achievability of this theorem follows from Theorem 1 by choosing Uk = xk ∼ N(0,Qk). The converse proof is
presented in Appendix B.
According to (69), it is easy to show that:
Corollary 2: The total S-DoF for the degraded Gaussian MIMO MAC is η = 0.
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Fig. 2. Separation/Alignment of Signals at the Intended Receiver/Eavesdropper
Now consider the general Gaussian MIMO MAC where it’s not necessarily degraded. According to Theorem 1, by choosing
Uk = xk ∼ N (0,Qk), it is easy to see that the following secrecy sum rate is achievable.
Corollary 3: For the Gaussian MIMO MAC, an achievable secrecy sum rate is given by
Rsum =
∑
k∈K
Rk = max
Q:Q0,Tr(Q)≤P
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
HkQkH
†
k
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
Hk,eQkH
†
k,e
∣∣∣∣∣ . (18)
Note that in the above achievable scheme, we chose Kxk = Qk which generally is not optimal. In general, solving the
maximization problem of (18) is difficult. Reference [20], however, has solved this problem for a single antenna case and
derived the optimal power control policy. As shown in [20] even for a single antenna case some users need to be silent and
therefore those users can cooperatively help to jam the eavesdropper.
We study the S-DoF defined in (11) to analyze the behavior of the sum rate in high SNR. We design the following strategy
scheme at the transmitters.
To achieve the largest value for S-DoF we need to separate the received signals at the legitimate receiver, such that each
received signal has a different dimension in the signal space of the legitimate receiver. At the same time all the received signals
at the eavesdropper need to be aligned in a minimal subspace of the signal space of the eavesdropper (see Fig.2).
Let xk = Fkvk where, Fk is a pre-coding matrix such that FkF†k = Qk and vk is a vector with i.i.d Gaussian
components with zero mean and unit variance, i.e, vk = [v1k, ..., vNk ]†, such that v
j
k ∼ N (0, 1) for j = 1, 2, ..., N . Let
ψi = [0, 0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0]
† be a N × 1 vector that all of its elements are zero except the ith element which is 1. Let
Fk = [f
1
k , f
2
k , ..., f
N
k ], where f ik’s for i = 1, 2, ..., N are N × 1 vectors that represent the columns of Fk. We use the following
algorithm to choose f ik’s:
• Assume that for users k = 1, 2, ..., J , the matrix Hk,e has non-empty null space and the null space of Hk,e for users
k = J + 1, J + 2, ...,K is empty. The users k = 1, 2, ...,min{J,N} choose f1k such that Hk,ef1k = 0. Almost surly, we
can assume that these vectors occupy separate dimensions at the legitimate receiver.
• If J ≥ N , then all the N dimensions at the legitimate receiver are full and η = N .
• If J < N , users k = J+1, J+2, ...,min{K,N} then create a vector f1k such that Hk,ef1k = ψ1. Theses vectors, therefore,
are aligned at the eavesdropper in one dimension and almost surely occupy separate dimensions in the remaining subspace
of the legitimate receiver.
• If N ≤ K , at this step all the dimensions at the legitimate receiver are full and one dimension at the eavesdropper has a
non-zero signal. Thus, η = N − 1.
• If N > K , users k = 1, 2, ..., J then also creates a vector f2k such that Hk,ef2k = ψ1. These vectors are also aligned at
the dimension ψ1 and almost surely η = N − 1
• We repeat the above steps such that all the dimensions at the legitimate receiver become full.
The above algorithm can be followed when the users and the receivers are equipped with different numbers of antennae. The
following theorem characterizes the maximum amount of the total S-DoF that can be achieved by Gaussian codebooks.
Theorem 3: For the Gaussian MIMO MAC, the following η for S-DoF can almost surely be achieved for almost all channel
gains by using Gaussian codebooks and under perfect secrecy constraint:
η =
[
min
{∑
k∈K
Mk, N
}
− r
]+
, (19)
where 0 ≤ r ≤ min{∑k∈KMk, Ne} depends on the channel gain matrix He.
6Note that in Theorem 3, it is emphasized that total
[
min
{∑
k∈KMk, N
}− r]+ S-DoF is achievable for almost all channel
gains. It means the set of all possible gains that the total amount of
[
min
{∑
k∈KMk, N
}− r]+ S-DoF may not be achieved
has the Lebesgue measure zero. In other words, if all the channel gains are drawn independently from a random distribution,
then almost all of them satisfy properties required to achieve the total S-DoF, almost surely. The term “almost surely” means
with a probability arbitrary close to 1.
Remark 1: In the achievability scheme of Theorem 3, all the transmitted signals are aligned into a r dimensional subspace
at the eavesdropper, and hence, impairs the ability of the eavesdropper to distinguish any of the secure messages efficiently.
Now assume that the transmitters can cooperate with each other: we have a MIMO wiretap channel where the transmitter has∑
k∈KMk antennas and the legitimate and eavesdropper have N and Ne antennas, respectively. The secrecy capacity of this
channel is indeed an upper-bound for the secrecy sum capacity of the Gaussian MIMO MAC. As the capacity of a non-secret
MIMO channel is an upper-bound for the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel, we have the following upper-bound
for S-DoF for the secure Gaussian MIMO MAC.
Lemma 1: For the Gaussian MIMO MAC, the maximum total achievable S-DoF under perfect secrecy constraint is given
by
ηmax = min
{∑
k∈K
Mk, N
}
. (20)
The maximum penalty for the achievable S-DoF in Theorem 3 is therefore r, where, 0 ≤ r ≤ min{∑k∈KMk, Ne}. We note
that an achievable S-DoF in the MIMO wiretap channel using zero-forcing beamforming is given as follows.
Lemma 2: In the MIMO wiretap channel, the following S-DoF is achievable, almost surely.
η = min

[∑
k∈K
Mk − r′
]+
, N
 , (21)
where 1 ≤ r′ ≤ Ne depends on the channel gain matrix He.
Remark 2: When the transmitters and the intended receiver are equipped with a sufficiently large number of antenna while
the eavesdropper is equipped with a limited number of antenna, then Gaussian codebooks provide a near optimum total of
S-DoF for the Gaussian MIMO multiple-access-channel under perfect secrecy constraint.
Note that when the transmitters and the receivers are equipped with a single antenna, i.e., Mk = Ne = N = 1, then the total
achieved S-DoF is 0. It should be noted that this result comes from the lack of enough dimension for signal management
at the receivers by using Gaussian codebooks. In our achievability scheme, nodes K − 1 send sequences from a codebook
randomly generated in an i.i.d. fashion according to a Gaussian distribution. These are the worst noises from the eavesdroppers
perspective if Gaussian i.i.d. signaling is used in X1, see [31]. However, since the channel is fully connected, K − 1 are also
the worst noises for the intended receiver. This effect causes the secrecy rate to saturate, leading to zero S-DoF. The following
Theorem establishes an upper-bound for the total S-DoF.
IV. SECURE DOF OF THE SINGLE-ANTENNA MULTIPLE-ACCESS-CHANNEL
In this section we consider the secure multiple-access-channel of (1) when all the transmitters and the receivers have a single
antenna, i.e., Mk = N = Ne = 1 for all k ∈ K. We showed in the previous section that Gaussian codebooks lead to zero
total S-DoF. Here, we will provide a coding scheme based on integer codebooks and show that for almost all channel gains a
positive total S-DoF is achievable, almost surely. The following theorem illustrates our results.
Theorem 4: For the Gaussian single antenna multiple-access-channel of (1) with Mk = N = Ne = 1, a total K−1K secure
degrees-of-freedom can be achieved for almost all channel gains, almost surely.
Proof: When the transmitters and the receivers are equipped with a single antenna, then the channel model of (1) is
equivalent as follows:
Y=
K∑
k=1
hkXk + W˜1 (22)
Z=
K∑
k=1
hk,eXk + W˜2,
7where W˜1 ∼ N (0, 1), W˜2 ∼ N (0, 1), and E[X2k ] ≤ P for all k ∈ K. Let us define X˜k
△
=
hk,e
A
Xk and h˜k
△
= hk
hk,e
and without
loss of generality assume that h˜K = 1, then the channel model is equivalent as follows:
Y= A
[
K−1∑
k=1
h˜kX˜k + X˜K
]
+ W˜1 (23)
Z= A
K∑
k=1
X˜k + W˜2,
where, A2E[X˜2k ] ≤ P˜
△
= h2k,eP . In this model we say that the signals are aligned at the eavesdropper according to the following
definition:
Definition 2: The signals X˜1, X˜2,...,X˜K are said to be aligned at a receiver if its received signal is a rational combination
of them.
Note that, in n-dimensional Euclidean spaces (n ≥ 2), two signals are aligned when they are received in the same direction
at the receiver. In general, m signals are aligned at a receiver if they span a subspace with dimension less than m. The above
definition, however, generalizes the concept of alignment for the one-dimensional real numbers. Our coding scheme is based
on integer codebooks, which means that X˜k ∈ Z for all k ∈ K. If some integer signals are aligned at a receiver, then their
effect is similar to a single signal at high SNR regimes. This is due to the fact that rational numbers form a filed and therefore
the sum of constellations from Q form a constellation in Q with an enlarged cardinality.
Before we present our achievability scheme, we need to define the rational dimension of a set of real numbers.
Definition 3: (Rational Dimension) The rational dimension of a set of real numbers {h˜1, h˜2, ..., h˜K−1, h˜K = 1} is M if
there exists a set of real numbers {g1, g2, ..., gM} such that each h˜k can be represented as a rational combination of gis, i.e.,
h˜k = ak,1g1 + ak,2g2 + ...+ ak,MgM , where ak,i ∈ Q for all k ∈ K and i ∈ M.
In fact, the rational dimension of a set of channel gains is the effective dimension seen at the corresponding receiver. In
particular, {h˜1, h˜2, ..., h˜K} are rationally independent if the rational dimension is K , i.e., none of the h˜k can be represented
as the rational combination of other numbers.
Note that all of the channel gains h˜k are generated independently with a distribution. From the number theory, it is known
that the set of all possible channel gains that are rationally independent have a Lebesgue measure 1. Therefore, we can assume
that {h˜1, h˜2, ..., h˜K} are rationally independent, almost surely. Our achievability coding scheme is as follows:
1) Encoding: Each transmitter limits its input symbols to a finite set which is called the transmit constellation. Even though
it has access to the continuum of real numbers, restriction to a finite set has the benefit of easy and feasible decoding at the
intended receiver. The transmitter k selects a constellation Vk to send message Wk . The constellation points are chosen from
integer points, i.e., Vk ⊂ Z. We assume that Vk is a bounded set. Hence, there is a constant Qk such that Vk ⊂ [−Qk, Qk].
The cardinality of Vk which limits the rate of message Wk is denoted by ‖Vk‖.
Having formed the constellation, the transmitter k constructs a random codebook for message Wk with rate Rk. This can
be accomplished by choosing a probability distribution on the input alphabets. The uniform distribution is the first candidate
and it is selected for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, the stochastic encoder k generates 2n(I(X˜k;Y |X˜(K−k)c )+ǫk) independent
and identically distributed sequences x˜nk according to the distribution P (x˜nk ) =
∏n
i=1 P (x˜k,i), where P (x˜k,i) denotes the
probability distribution function of the uniformly distributed random variable x˜k,i over Vk. Next, randomly distribute these
sequences into 2nRk bins. Index each of the bins by wk ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nRk}.
For each user k ∈ K, to send message wk , the transmitter looks for a x˜nk in bin wk . The rates are such that there exist
more than one x˜nk . The transmitter randomly chooses one of them and sends xnk = A
x˜nk
hk,e
. The parameter A controls the input
power.
2) Decoding: At a specific time, the received signal at the legitimate receiver is as follows:
Y = A
[
h˜1X˜1 + h˜2X˜2 + ...+ h˜K−1X˜K−1 + X˜K
]
+ W˜1 (24)
The legitimate receiver passes the received signal Y through a hard decoder. The hard decoder looks for a point Y˜ in the received
constellation Vr = A
[
h˜1V1 + h˜2V2 + ...+ h˜K−1VK−1 + VK
]
which is the nearest point to the received signal Y . Therefore,
the continuous channel changes to a discrete one in which the input symbols are taken from the transmit constellations Vk and
the output symbols belongs to the received constellation Vr. h˜k’s are rationally independent which means that the equation
A
[
h˜1X1 + h˜2X2 + ...+ h˜K−1XK−1 +XK
]
= 0 has no rational solution. This property implies that any real number vr
belonging to the constellation Vr is uniquely decomposable as vr = A
∑K
k=1 h˜k
̂˜
Xk. Note that if there exists another possible
decomposition v˜r = A
∑K
k=1 h˜k
̂˜
X
′
k, then h˜k’s have to be rationally-dependent which is a contradiction. We call this property
as property Γ. This property in fact implies that if there is no additive noise in the channel, then the receiver can decode all
the transmitted signals with zero error probability.
8Remark 3: In a random environment it is easy to show that the set of channels gains which are rationally-dependent has a
measure of zero with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Therefore, Property Γ is almost surely satisfied.
3) Error Probability Analysis: Let dmin denote the minimum distance in the received constellation Vr. Having property
Γ, the receiver can decode the transmitted signals. Let Vr and Vˆr be the transmitted and decoded symbols, respectively. The
probability of error, i.e., Pe = P (Vˆr 6= Vr), is bounded as follows:
Pe ≤ Q(dmin
2
) ≤ exp(−d
2
min
8
) (25)
where Q(x) = 1√
2π
∫∞
x
exp(− t22 )dt. Note that finding dmin is not easy in general. Using Khintchine and Groshev theorems,
however, it is possible to lower bound the minimum distance. Here we explain some background information for using the
theorems of Khintchine and Groshev.
The field of Diophantine approximation in number theory deals with approximation of real numbers with rational numbers.
The reader is referred to [32], [33] and the references therein. The Khintchine theorem is one of the cornerstones in this field.
This theorem provides a criteria for a given function ψ : N→ R+ and real number h, such that |p+ h˜q| < ψ(|q|) has either
infinitely many solutions or at most, finitely many solutions for (p, q) ∈ Z2. Let A(ψ) denote the set of real numbers such
that |p + h˜q| < ψ(|q|) has infinitely many solutions in integers. The theorem has two parts. The first part is the convergent
part and states that if ψ(|q|) is convergent, i.e.,
∞∑
q=1
ψ(q) <∞ (26)
then A(ψ) has a measure of zero with respect to the Lebesque measure. This part can be rephrased in a more convenient way,
as follows. For almost all real numbers, |p + h˜q| > ψ(|q|) holds for all (p, q) ∈ Z2 except for finitely many of them. Since
the number of integers violating the inequality is finite, one can find a constant c such that
|p+ h˜q| > cψ(|q|) (27)
holds for all integers p and q, almost surely. The divergent part of the theorem states that A(ψ) has the full measure, i.e. the
set R−A(ψ) has measure zero, provided that ψ is decreasing and ψ(|q|) is divergent, i.e.,
∞∑
q=1
ψ(q) =∞. (28)
There is an extension to Khintchines theorem which regards the approximation of linear forms. Let h˜ = (h˜1, h˜2, ..., h˜K−1) and
q = (q1, q2, ..., qK−1) denote (K − 1)-tuples in RK−1 and ZK−1, respectively. Let AK−1(ψ) denote the set of (K − 1)-tuple
real numbers h˜ such that
|p+ q1h˜1 + q2h˜2 + ...+ qK−1h˜K−1| < ψ(|q|∞) (29)
has infinitely many solutions for p ∈ Z and q ∈ ZK−1. Here, |q|∞ is the supreme norm of q which is defined as maxk |qk|.
The following theorem illustrates the Lebesque measure of the set AK−1(ψ) [].
Theorem 5: (Khintchine-Groshev) Let ψ : N→ R+. Then, the set AK−1(ψ) has measure zero provided that
∞∑
q=1
qK−2ψ(q) <∞ (30)
and has the full measure if ∞∑
q=1
qK−2ψ(q) =∞ and ψ is monotonic (31)
In this paper, we are interested in the convergent part of the theorem. Moreover, given an arbitrary ǫ > 0 the function
ψ(q) = 1
qK−1+ǫ
satisfies the condition of (30). In fact, the convergent part of the above theorem can be stated as follows. For
almost all K − 1-tuple real numbers h˜ there exists a constant c such that
|p+ q1h˜1 + q2h˜2 + ...+ qK−1h˜K−1| > c
(maxk |qk|)K−1+ǫ (32)
holds for all p ∈ Z and q ∈ ZK−1. The Khintchine-Groshev theorem can be used to bound the minimum distance of points
in the received constellation Vr. In fact, a point in the received constellation has a linear form of
vr = A
[
h˜1v1 + h˜2v2 + ...+ h˜K−1vK−1 + vK
]
, (33)
Therefore, we can conclude that
dmin >
Ac
(maxk∈{1,2,...,K−1}Qk)K−1+ǫ
. (34)
9The probability of error in hard decoding, see (25), can be bounded as:
Pe < exp
(
− (Ac)
2
8(maxk∈{1,2,...,K−1}Qk)2K−2+2ǫ
)
(35)
Let us assume that Qk for all k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K − 1} is Q = ⌊P˜
1−ǫ
2(K+ǫ) ⌋. Moreover, since E[X˜2k ] ≤ A2Q2k ≤ P˜ , we can choose
A = P˜
K−1+2ǫ
2(K+ǫ)
. Substituting in (35) yields
Pe < exp(−c
2
8
P˜ ǫ). (36)
Thus, Pe → 0 when P˜ →∞ or equivalently P →∞.
4) Equivocation Calculation: Since the equivocation analysis of Theorem 1 is valid for any input distribution, therefore
integer inputs satisfy the perfect secrecy constraint.
5) S-DoF Calculation: The maximum achievable sum rate is as follows:∑
k∈K
Rk= I(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K ;Y )− I(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K ;Z) (37)
= H(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K |Z)−H(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K |Y )
(a)
≥ H(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K |Z)− 1− Pe log ‖X˜ ‖
(b)
≥ H(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K |
∑
k∈K
X˜k)− 1− Pe log ‖X˜ ‖
(c)
=
∑
k∈K
H(X˜k)−H(
∑
k∈K
X˜k)− 1− Pe log ‖X˜‖
(d)
= K log(2Q+ 1)− log(2KQ+ 1)− 1− Pe log ‖X˜ ‖,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the fact that conditioning always decreases entropy, (c) follows
from chain rule, and (d) follows from the fact that X˜k has uniform distribution over Vk = [−Q,Q]. The S-DoF therefore can
be computed as follows:
η= lim
P→∞
∑
k∈K Rk
1
2 logP
(38)
=
(K − 1)(1− ǫ)
K + ǫ
Since ǫ can be arbitrarily small, then η = K−1
K
is indeed achievable.
As we saw in the previous section, multiple-antennas (or equivalently, time-varying and/or frequency-selective channels)
provide enough freedom, which allows us to choose appropriate signaling directions to separate between the messages at
the intended receiver and at the same time pack the signals into a low dimensionality subspace at the eavesdropper. In contrary,
it was commonly believed that time-invariant frequency flat single-antenna channels cannot provide any degrees-of-freedom.
In Theorem, 4 however, we developed a machinery that transforms the single-antenna systems to a pseudo multiple-antenna
system with some antennas. The number of available dimensions in the equivalent pseudo multiple-antenna systems is K when
all of K channel gains between the transmitters and the intended receiver are rationally-independent (this condition is satisfied
almost surely). The equivalent pseudo multiple-antenna system can simulate the behavior of a multiple-dimensional system
(in time/frequency/space) and allows us to simultaneously separate the signals at the intended receiver and align them to the
eavesdropper.
Note that in the MISOSE wire-tap channel (Multiple-Input Single-Output Single-Eavesdropper), when the channel realization
is unique, we can achieve the optimum S-DoF of 1 through cooperation among transmitters. This Theorem clarifies the fact
that, we lose the amount of 1
K
in S-DoF due to the lack of cooperation between the transmitters. We still gain through the
possibility of signal alignment at the eavesdropper, however.
A. Rationally-Dependent Channel Gains: Multiple-layer coding
When the channel gains are rationally dependent, then a more sophisticated multiple-layer constellation design is required
to achieve higher S-DoF. The reason is that some messages share the same dimension at the intended receiver and as a
result, splitting them requires more structure in constellations. We propose a multiple-layer constellation that can not only be
distinguished at the intended receiver but are also packed efficiently at the eavesdropper. This is accomplished by allowing
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a carry-over from different levels. In this subsection, for the sake of simplicity, we consider a two user-secure MAC. This
channel is modeled as follows:
Y= A
[
h˜1X˜1 + X˜2
]
+ W˜1 (39)
Z= A
[
X˜1 + X˜2
]
+ W˜2,
where A controls the output power. When the channel gain h˜1 is irrational then according to Theorem 4 the total S-DoF of
1
2 is indeed achievable. For the rational channel gain h˜1 =
n
m
, n,m ∈ N,m 6= 0, however, the coding scheme of Theorem 4
fails and we need to use a multiple-layer coding scheme.
In multiple-layer coding scheme, we select the constellation points in the base W ∈ N as follows:
v(b) =
L−1∑
l=0
blW
l, (40)
where, bl for all l ∈ {0, 1, ..., L − 1} are independent random variables which take value from {0, 1, 2, ..., , a − 1} with
uniform probability distribution. b represents the vector b = {b0, b1, ..., bL−1} and the parameter a controls the number of
constellation points. We assume that a < W and therefore, all constellation points are distinct and the size of the constellations
are |V1| = |V2| = aL. The maximum possible rate for each user is therefore bounded by L log a.
At each transmitter a random codebook is generated by randomly choosing bl according to a uniform distribution. The signal
transmitted by users 1 and 2 are X˜1 = v(b) and X˜2 = v(b
′
), respectively. Note that the above multiple-layer constellation
had a DC component and this component needs to be removed at the transmitters. The DC component, however, duplicated
the achievable rates and has no effect on the S-DoF.
To calculate A, since bl and bj are independent for l 6= j, we have the following chain of inequalities:
A2E[X˜21 ]= A
2W 2(L−1)
L−1∑
l=0
E[b2l ]W
−2l (41)
≤ A2W 2(L−1) (a− 1)(2a− 1)
6
∞∑
l=0
W−2l
≤ A2W 2(L−1)a
2
3
1
1−W−2
≤ A
2a2W 2L
W 2 − 1 .
Therefore, by choosing A =
√
(W 2−1)P˜
aWL
the power constraint A2EX˜21 ≤ P˜ is satisfied. The received constellation at the
intended receiver and the eavesdropper can be written as follows, respectively:
Y=
A
m
L−1∑
l=0
(
nbl +mb
′
l
)
W l + W˜1 (42)
Z= A
L−1∑
l=0
(
bl + b
′
l
)
W l + W˜2.
A point in the received constellation Vr of the intended receiver can be represented as follows:
vr(b,b
′
) =
A
m
L−1∑
l=0
(
nbl +mb
′
l
)
W l. (43)
Note that the received constellation needs to satisfy the property Γ, as the intended receiver needs to uniquely decode the
transmitted signals. The following theorem characterizes the total achievable S-DoF.
Theorem 6: The following S-DoF is achievable for the two user single antenna MAC with rational channel gain h˜1 = nm :
η =

log(n)
log(n(2n−1)) , if 2n ≥ m
log(s+1)
log((s+1)(2s+1)) , if 2n < m and m = 2s+ 1
log(s)
log(2s2−n) , if 2n < m and m = 2s
(44)
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TABLE I
CHOSEN a AND W TO SATISFY PROPERTY Γ
h˜1 =
n
m
a W
Case 1 2n ≥ m n n(2n− 1)
Case 2 2n < m and m = 2s+ 1 s+ 1 (s+ 1)(2s + 1)
Case 3 2n < m and m = 2s s 2s2 − n
Proof: Let us first assume that the property Γ is satisfied for given W and a. It is easy to show that the minimum distance
in the received constellation Vr is dmin = Am . The probability of error is therefore bounded as follows:
Pe≤ exp(−d
2
min
8
) (45)
= exp
(
− (W
2 − 1)P˜
8a2m2W 2L
)
.
Let us choose L as
L =
⌊
log(P˜ 0.5−ǫ)
log(W )
⌋
, (46)
where ǫ > 0 is an arbitrary small constant. Clearly, with this choice of L, Pe ≤ exp(−γP˜ 2ǫ) where γ is a constant. Thus,
when SNR→∞, then Pe → 0. Using (37), the S-DoF of the system can be derived as follows:
η= lim
P˜→∞
L log(a)
1
2 log P˜
(47)
= lim
P˜→∞
⌊
log(P˜ 0.5−ǫ)
log(W )
⌋
log(a)
1
2 log P˜
= (1− 2ǫ) log(a)
log(W )
.
Since ǫ is an arbitrary small constant, the total S-DoF of the system is
η =
log(a)
log(W )
. (48)
This equation implies that to achieve the maximum possible η, we need to maximize a and minimize W with the constraint
that the property Γ is satisfied. Table I shows the choices of a and W for Theorem 6. To complete the proof we need to show
that with the choices of Table I, the property Γ is satisfied.
Lemma 3: The property Γ holds for all the choices of Table I.
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
Note that this result implies that the total achievable S-DoF by using integer lattice codes is discontinuous with respect to the
channel coefficients.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered a K user secure Gaussian MAC with an external eavesdropper. We proved an achievable
rate region for the secure discrete memoryless MAC and thereafter we established the secrecy sum capacity of the degraded
Gaussian MIMO MAC using Gaussian codebooks. For the non-degraded Gaussian MIMO MAC, we proposed an algorithm
inspired by the interference alignment technique to achieve the largest possible total S-DoF. When all the terminals are equipped
with single antenna, the Gaussian codebooks lead to zero S-DoF. Therefore, we proposed a novel secure coding scheme to
achieve positive S-DoF in the single antenna MAC. This scheme converts the single-antenna system into a multiple-dimension
system with fractional dimensions. The achievability scheme is based on the alignment of signals into a small sub-space at
the eavesdropper, and the simultaneous separation of the signals at the intended receiver. We proved that total S-DoF of K−1
K
can be achieved for almost all channel gains which are rationally independent. For the rationally dependent channel gains,
we illustrated the power of the multi-layer coding scheme, through an example channel, to achieve a positive S-DoF. As a
function of channel gains, therefore, we showed that the achievable S-DoF is discontinues.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
1) Codebook Generation: The structure of the encoder for user k ∈ K is depicted in Fig.Fix P (uk) and P (xk|uk). The
stochastic encoder k generates 2n(I(Uk;Y |U(K−k)c )+ǫk) independent and identically distributed sequences unk according to the
distribution P (unk) =
∏n
i=1 P (uk,i). Next, randomly distribute these sequences into 2nRk bins. Index each of the bins by
wk ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nRk}.
2) Encoding: For each user k ∈ K, to send message wk , the transmitter looks for a unk in bin wk. The rates are such that
there exist more than one unk . The transmitter randomly chooses one of them and then generates xnk according to P (xnk |unk ) =∏n
i=1 P (xk,i|uk,i) and sends it.
3) Decoding: The received signals at the legitimate receiver, yn, is the output of the channel P (yn|xnK) =
∏n
i=1 P (yi|xK,i).
The legitimate receiver looks for the unique sequence unK such that (unK, yn) is jointly typical and declares the indices of the
bins containing unk as the messages received.
4) Error Probability Analysis: Since the region of (12) is a subset of the capacity region of the multiple-access-channel
without secrecy constraint, then the error probability analysis is the same as [3] and omitted here.
5) Equivocation Calculation: To satisfy the perfect secrecy constraint, we need to prove the requirement of (7). From
H(WK|Zn) we have
H(WK|Zn)= H(WK, Zn)−H(Zn) (49)
= H(WK, UnK, Z
n)−H(UnK|WK, Zn)−H(Zn)
= H(WK, UnK) +H(Z
n|WK, UnK)−H(UnK|WK, Zn)−H(Zn)
(a)
≥ H(WK, UnK) +H(Zn|WK, UnK)− nǫn −H(Zn)
(b)
= H(WK, UnK) +H(Z
n|UnK)− nǫn −H(Zn)
(c)
≥ H(UnK) +H(Zn|UnK)− nǫn −H(Zn)
= H(UnK)− I(UnK;Zn)− nǫn
(d)
≥ I(UnK;Y n)− I(UnK;Zn)− nǫn
(e)
≥ n
∑
k∈K
Rk − nǫn − nδ1n − nδ4n
= H(WK)− nǫn − nδ1n − nδ4n,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, which states that for sufficiently large n, H(UnK|WK, Zn) ≤ h(P (n)we ) +nPnweRw ≤
nǫn. Here Pnwe denotes the wiretapper’s error probability of decoding unK in the case that the bin numbers wK are known to
the eavesdropper and Rw = I(UK;Z). Since the sum rate is small enough, then Pnwe → 0 for sufficiently large n. (b) follows
from the following Markov chain: WK → UnK → Zn. Hence, we have H(Zn|WK, UnK) = H(Zn|UnK). (c) follows from the
fact that H(WK, UnK) ≥ H(UnK). (d) follows from that fact that H(UnK) ≥ I(UnK;Y n). (e) follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 4: Assume UnK, Y n and Zn are generated according to the achievability scheme of Theorem 1, then we have,
nI(UK;Y )− nδ1n ≤ I(UnK;Y n) ≤ nI(UK;Y ) + nδ2n (50)
nI(UK;Z)− nδ3n ≤ I(UnK;Zn) ≤ nI(UK;Z) + nδ4n, (51)
where, δ1n, δ2n, δ3n, δ4n → 0 when n→∞.
Proof: We first prove (50). Let A(n)ǫ (PUK,Z) denote the set of typical sequences (unK, zn) with respect to PUK,Z , and
ζ =
{
1, (unK, z
n) ∈ A(n)ǫ
0, otherwise
(52)
be the corresponding indicator function. We expand I(UnK;Zn, ζ) and I(UnK, ζ;Zn) as follow:
I(UnK;Z
n, ζ)= I(UnK;Z
n) + I(UnK; ζ|Zn) (53)
= I(UnK; ζ) + I(U
n
K;Z
n|ζ),
I(UnK, ζ;Z
n)= I(UnK;Z
n) + I(ζ;Zn|UnK) (54)
= I(ζ;Zn) + I(UnK;Z
n|ζ).
Therefore, we have
I(UnK;Zn|ζ)− I(UnK; ζ|Zn) ≤ I(UnK;Zn) ≤ I(UnK;Zn|ζ) + I(ζ;Zn). (55)
13
Note that I(ζ;Zn) ≤ H(ζ) ≤ 1 and I(UnK; ζ|Zn) ≤ H(ζ|Zn) ≤ H(ζ) ≤ 1. Thus, the above inequality implies that
1∑
j=0
P (ζ = j)I(UnK;Zn|ζ = j)− 1 ≤ I(UnK;Zn) ≤
1∑
j=0
P (ζ = j)I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = j) + 1. (56)
According to the joint typicality property, we have
0 ≤ P (ζ = 1)I(UnK;Zn|ζ = 1) ≤ nP ((unK, zn) ∈ A(n)ǫ (PUK,Z)) log ‖Z‖ ≤ nǫn log ‖Z‖. (57)
Now consider the term P (ζ = 0)I(UnK;Zn|ζ = 0). Following the sequence joint typicality properties, we have
(1− ǫn)I(UnK;Zn|ζ = 0) ≤ P (ζ = 0)I(UnK;Zn|ζ = 0) ≤ I(UnK;Zn|ζ = 0), (58)
where
I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = 0) =
∑
(un
K
,zn)∈A(n)ǫ
P (unK, z
n) log
P (unK, z
n)
P (unK)P (zn)
. (59)
Since H(UK, Z)− ǫn ≤ − 1n logP (unK, zn) ≤ H(UK, Z) + ǫn, then we have,
n [−H(UK, Z) +H(UK) +H(Z)− 3ǫn] ≤ I(UnK;Zn|ζ = 0) ≤ n [−H(UK, Z) +H(UK) +H(Z) + 3ǫn] , (60)
or equivalently,
n [I(UK;Z)− 3ǫn] ≤ I(UnK;Zn|ζ = 0) ≤ n [I(UK;Z) + 3ǫn] . (61)
By substituting (61) into (58) and then substituting (58) and (57) into (56), we get the desired result,
nI(UK;Z)− nδ1n ≤ I(UnK;Zn) ≤ nI(UK;Z) + nδ2n, (62)
where
δ1n = ǫnI(UK;Z) + 3(1− ǫn)ǫn + 1
n
(63)
δ2n = 3ǫn + ǫn log ‖Z‖+ 1
n
.
Following the same steps, one can prove (51).
B. Proof of the Converse for Theorem 2
Before starting the proof, we first present some useful lemmas.
Lemma 5: The secrecy sum capacity of the Gaussian MIMO MAC is upper-bounded by
Csum ≤ max
P (x1)P (x2)...P (xK)
I(x1,x2, ...,xK;y|z), (64)
where maximization is over all distributions P (x1)P (x2)...P (xK) that satisfy the power constraint, i.e., Tr(x†x) ≤ P .
Proof: According to Fano’s inequality and the perfect secrecy constraint, we have
n
∑
k∈K
Rk≤ I(WK;yn)− I(WK; zn) (65)
(a)
≤ I(WK;yn, zn)− I(WK; zn)
(b)
= I(WK;yn|zn)
= h(yn|zn)− h(yn|WK, zn)
(c)
≤ h(yn|zn)− h(yn|WK,xnK, zn)
(d)
≤ h(yn|zn)− h(yn|xnK, zn)
(e)
≤ h(yn|zn)−
n∑
i=1
h(y(i)|xK(i), z(i))
(f)
≤
n∑
i=1
h(y(i)|z(i))− h(y(i)|xK(i), z(i))
≤ nI(xK;y|z, q)
(g)
≤ nI(xK;y|z),
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where (a) and (b) follows from chain rule, (c) follows from the fact that conditioning decreases the differential entropy, (d)
follows from the Markov chain WK → (xnK, zn) → yn, (e) follows from the fact that the channel is memoryless, (f) is
obtained by defining a time-sharing random variable q that takes values uniformly over the index set {1, 2, ..., n} and defining
(xK,y, z) to be the tuple of random variables that conditioned on q = i, have the same joint distribution as (xK(i),y(i), z(i)).
Finally, (g) follows from the fact that I(xK;y|z) is concave in P (x1)...P (xK) (see, e.g.,[],[9, Appendix I] for a proof), so
that Jensens inequality can be applied.
Lemma 6: If DHk = Hk,e for all k ∈ K and DD†  I, then the function
f(X1,X2, ...,XK) =
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
HkXkH
†
k
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
Hk,eXkH
†
k,e
∣∣∣∣∣ (66)
is a concave function of (X1, ...,XK) for Xk  0 for all k ∈ K. Moreover, for (X1, ...,XK) such that Xk  0 and
(∆1, ...,∆K) such that ∆k  0, we have
f(X1, ...,XK) ≤ f(X1 +∆1, ...,XK +∆K). (67)
Proof: Using the degradedness property of DHk = Hk,e, the function f(.) can be re-written as follows:
f(X1,X2, ...,XK)=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
HkXkH
†
k
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
Hk,eXkH
†
k,e
∣∣∣∣∣ (68)
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
HkXkH
†
k
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
DHkXkH
†
kD
†
∣∣∣∣∣
(a)
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣I+∑k∈KHkXkH†k∣∣∣∣∣∣[(D†D)−1 − I]+ [I+∑k∈KHkXkH†k]∣∣∣ |D†D| , (69)
where (a) follows from the fact that |I+AB| = |I+BA|. According to [23, Lemma II.3], this function is concave with
regard to I+
∑
k∈KHkXkH
†
k, and is therefore concave with regard to (X1,X2, ...,XK).
To prove the property of (67), note that for any A  0, ∆  0 and B ≻ 0, we have the following property [24,p.3942]:
|B|
|A+B| ≤
|B+∆|
|A+B+∆| . (70)
We choose ∆ =
∑
k∈KHk∆kH
†
k and apply the above property to (69). We thus obtain,
f(X1,X2, ...,XK)=
1
2
log
∣∣∣I+∑k∈KHkXkH†k∣∣∣∣∣∣[(D†D)−1 − I]+ [I+∑k∈KHkXkH†k]∣∣∣ |D†D| (71)
≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣I+∑k∈KHk (Xk +∆k)H†k∣∣∣∣∣∣[(D†D)−1 − I]+ [I+∑k∈KHk (Xk +∆k)H†k]∣∣∣ |D†D|
= f(X1 +∆1, ...,XK +∆K).
To prove the converse part, we first start with Lemma 5 to bound the sum rate as follows:∑
k∈K
Rk≤ I(xK;y|z) (72)
= h(y|z) − h(y|xK, z)
= h(y|z) − h(n1)
(a)
=
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
HkKxkH
†
k
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
Hk,eKxkH
†
k,e
∣∣∣∣∣
(b)
≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I+∑
k∈K
HkQkH
†
k
∣∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣∣I+ ∑
k∈K
Hk,eQkH
†
k,e
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where (a) follows from the fact that h(y|z) is maximized by jointly Gaussian y and z for fixed covariance matrix Qy,z and
(b) follows from the degradedness assumption and therefore concavity and monotonicity properties given in Lemma 6 and the
fact that Kxk  Qk.
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C. Proof of Lemma 3
We prove this lemma by induction on L. To show the lemma for L = 0, it is sufficient to prove that the equation
n(b0 − b˜0) +m(b′0 − b˜
′
0) = 0, (73)
has no nontrivial solution when b0, b
′
0, b˜0, b˜
′
0 ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., a−1}. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the equation (73)
are that b′0 − b˜
′
0 is dividable by n and b0 − b˜0 is dividable by n. We show that one of these conditions does not hold for all
choices of Table I.
Case 1: In this case a = n. Following the fact that −(n− 1) ≤ b′0 − b˜
′
0 ≤ n− 1, it is easy to deduce that n ∤ (b
′
0 − b˜
′
0).,
Case 2: In this case a = s + 1 where m = 2s + 1. Following the fact that −(2s + 1) ≤ b0 − b˜0 ≤ 2s + 1, it is easy to
deduce that m ∤ b0 − b˜0.
Case 3: In this case a = s where m = 2s. Following the fact that −2s ≤ b0 − b˜0 ≤ 2s, it is easy to show that m ∤ b0 − b˜0.
Now assume that property Γ holds for L− 1. We need to show that the equation
A
m
L−1∑
l=0
(
n(bl − b˜l) +m(b′l − b˜
′
l)
)
W l = 0, (74)
has no nontrivial solution. Equivalently, this equation can be written as follows:
n(b0 − b˜0) +m(b′0 − b˜
′
0) = W
L−2∑
l=0
(
n(bl+1 − b˜l+1) +m(b′l+1 − b˜
′
l+1)
)
W l. (75)
We prove that the above equation has no nontrivial solution in two steps. First, assume that the right hand side of (75) is zero.
This equation therefore reduces to
n(b0 − b˜0) +m(b′0 − b˜
′
0) = 0, (76)
which we have already shown that has no nontrivial solution for all three cases.
Secondly, assume that the right side of (75) is non-zero. The equation (75) can therefore be written as follows:
n(b0 − b˜0) +m(b′0 − b˜
′
0) = cW, (77)
where c ∈ Z and c 6= 0. We need to prove that equation (77) has no nontrivial solution for all three cases.
Case 1: In this case W = n(2n− 1) and n divides n(b0 − b˜0) and cW as well. However, as (m,n) = 1 and −(n− 1) ≤
b0− b˜0 ≤ n−1, the equation (77) has a solution iff b′0 = b˜
′
0 which is a contradiction with the fact that n|b0− b˜0| < n(n−1) <
|c|n(2n− 1) = |c|W .
Case 2: In this case W = (s + 1)(2s + 1), n = s + 1 and m = 2s + 1. Thus, 2s + 1 divides both m(b′0 − b˜
′
0) and cW .
Since (2n,m = 2s+ 1) = 1 and −2s ≤ b0 − b˜0 ≤ 2s, therefore, 2s+ 1 cannot divide n(b0 − b˜0). Hence, equation (77) has a
solution iff b0 = b˜0 which contradicts the fact that m|b′0 − b˜
′
0| < |c|W .
Case 3: In this case W = 2s2 − n, a = s, 2n < m and m = 2s. We have
|n(b0 − b˜0) +m(b′0 − b˜
′
0)|< m|b0 − b˜0 + b
′
0 − b˜
′
0| (78)
≤ 2m(a− 1)
= 4s(s− 1)
< 2W
and therefore, it suffices to assume c = 1. Substituting W = 2s2 − n in (77), we have the following equation:
n(b0 − b˜0 + 1) + 2s(b′0 − b˜
′
0) = 2s
2. (79)
Obviously, 2s divides 2s(b′0 − b˜
′
0) and = 2s2. However, since (2s, n) = 1 and −(2s− 1) ≤ b0 − b˜0 ≤ 2s− 1, equation (79)
has a solution iff b0 = b˜0 − 1 which is impossible due to the fact 2s|b′0 − b˜
′
0| < 2s2. This completes the proof.
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